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Abstract 
Purpose – Prosociality is considered important in the study of offenders and associated 
cognitive skills: theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning, are said to 
enable self-control and reduce the risk of offending behaviours. Previous research has made 
associations between these skills and executive functioning; however, research into a link 
between them, in an offending population, is limited. The paper aims to discuss this issue. 
Design/methodology/approach – To further understand the practicalities of this, the present 
study considered the predictive abilities of the constructs believed to underpin executive 
functioning: working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control, in relation to 
theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning. In total, 200 male and female 
offenders completed measures in all six constructs.  
Findings – Using path analysis working memory was demonstrated to be predictive of theory 
of mind and empathic understanding, cognitive flexibility was found to be predictive of 
theory of mind, and inhibitory control was found to be predictive of theory of mind, empathic 
understanding and moral reasoning.  
Research limitations/implications – The study focussed on offenders serving a custodial 
sentence of six months or less and did not differentiate between crime categories or take into 
consideration the socio-environmental backgrounds or ethnicity. Therefore, considering these 
things could further establish the generalisability of the current findings. It is noted that the 
more focussed the intervention is to the specific needs of an offender, the greater the impact 
will be. Therefore, pre-screening tests for the constructs discussed may be able to more 
accurately assess an offenders’ suitability for a programme, or indeed tailor it to meet the 
specific needs of that person. 
Practical implications – These findings may enable practitioners to more accurately assess 
offenders’ suitability for interventions aimed at reducing offending behaviours by improving 
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levels of prosociality and develop more focussed programmes to meet the specific needs of 
individual offenders to reduce re-offending. Social implications – As recommended in the 
study, a more tailored approach to offender rehabilitation may be a potential aid to reducing 
levels of recidivism. 
Originality/value – The present study adds to the literature as it is the first to consider 
whether the constructs of executive functioning can predict levels of theory of mind, 
empathic understanding and moral reasoning and so provide a more accurate method in 
assessing the cognitive abilities of offenders prior to participation in rehabilitative 
interventions. 
Keywords: Rehabilitation, Offenders, Empathy, Moral reasoning, Theory of mind, Executive 
functioning 
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Prosociality is considered important in the study of offenders. This is because the risk 
of offending behaviour is believed to be lowered if a person possesses certain prosocial skills 
(Prior and Paris,2005). From a cognitive perspective, these skills include theory of mind, 
empathic understanding and moral reasoning (Spenser et al., 2015). Spenser et al. noted that 
together these skills enable individuals to understand their own, as well as another’s, mental 
and emotional perspectives and behave in a morally acceptable way. Research has linked 
theory of mind (Russell et al., 2007), empathic understanding (Marques et al., 2015) and 
moral reasoning (Rueda and Paz-Alonso, 2013) to executive functioning. Executive 
functioning is a multidimensional cognitive control process (Best and Miller, 2010), 
described by the Harvard Centre for the Developing Child as “an air-traffic control system for 
the brain” (Centre on the Developing Child at Harvard University, 2011). 
As noted above, an association between executive functioning and theory of mind was 
first suggested by Russell et al. (2007). This link has intuitive appeal, as, for successful 
theory of mind, a person must be able to inhibit his or her own perspective, flexibly switch to 
the mind-set of another and process all the relevant information into a coherent picture. 
Similarly, there is evidence that executive functioning plays an important role in empathic 
understanding. For example, Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) indicated that, as well as being the 
result of affective arousal, empathic understanding may also arise from certain cognitive 
processes. In particular, Decety (2011) demonstrated that empathic understanding is 
moderated by how another person is “represented” in an individual conscience. This was 
evidenced in an earlier study by Hein et al. (2010) who studied the reactions of a group of 
football enthusiasts whilst they were watching a film of their favoured team fans and those of 
a rival team experiencing electric shocks. It was reported that more physical and emotional 
concern was evidenced for the favoured team fans, which may be routed in team rivalry. 
Executive functioning is likewise believed to play a role in the development of moral 
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reasoning. For example, neuroscientific studies have shown that mental abstraction and 
behavioural regulation share similar neural networks (Decety et al., 2012). 
However, to understand the practicalities of the proposed link between executive 
functioning and theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning, it is necessary 
to consider the cognitive abilities underpinning this construct. These abilities have been 
identified as working memory (Russell et al., 2007), cognitive flexibility (Diamond, 2013) 
and inhibitory control (Hala et al., 2003). Working memory is a “short-term store” in which 
individuals temporarily hold small amounts of knowledge or information relating to several 
mental states or physical situations (Russell et al., 2007). Cognitive flexibility allows a person 
to move between different mental conditions, whilst taking into account the social and 
structural rules that may apply to each (Diamond, 2013). This is said to enable people to 
guide their thoughts in accordance with their intentions or goals (Ponsioen, 2001). Whilst, 
inhibitory control is the ability to attend to, focus on, and prioritise, whilst deliberately 
repressing automatic responses based on habits or strong desires (Hala et al., 2003). 
However, the literature in support of these proposed links is limited. Gordon and Olson 
(1998) found a significant positive correlation between performance on a measure for 
working memory and theory of mind; noting that that a poor working memory was associated 
with the reduced capacity to simultaneously represent the different pieces of information as 
required by theory of mind. According to Malti and Latzko (2010), cognitive flexibility is of 
importance when applying empathic understanding. These researchers noted that empathic 
concern for the victims of moral wrongdoings may impact upon a child’s perception of the 
seriousness of an act. Lastly, Hughes (1998) found performance in an inhibitory control task 
related to language and understanding to be positively associated with measured abilities in 
theory of mind. Further, in the form of self-control, inhibitory control has also been 
associated with empathic understanding. Echols and Correll (2011), for example, compared 
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the neural reactions of doctors and a non-medical control group (matched for both age and 
IQ) whilst each watching a video of faces, hands and feet being: pricked by a needle, or, 
being touched by a cotton bud. These researchers noted that the “pain matrix” area of the 
brain was activated in the control group as they watched the first condition, but not the 
second. In contrast, the doctors demonstrated no reaction to either condition; thus, suggesting 
their ability to exercise inhibitory control. 
Together, working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control are said to allow 
a person to evaluate, organise and achieve goals, as well as flexibly adapt when confronted 
with novel problems and/or situations (Rueda and Paz-Alonso, 2013). Simply, these skills 
enable self-control (Rothbart, 2007); a lack of which (often resulting from neglect, abuse and 
instability) is thought to add to the risk of offending behaviours (Meijers et al., 2015). 
Simply, any risk factors that a person is exposed to may have a detrimental effect on early 
childhood brain development that later manifests as limited ability to retain information, loss 
of control, and a reduced ability to respond is a socially acceptable way (Ganesalingam et al., 
2011). 
However, whilst past research has demonstrated an association between executive 
functioning and theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning, few studies 
have considered a predictive relationship. Further, research from this perspective has 
produced inconclusive findings. For example, Hughes (1998) anticipated that early executive 
functioning would predict performance in ToM but found that this predictive relationship did 
not hold for all tasks used in his study. In addition, knowledge relating to the relationship 
between the executive functioning and theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral 
reasoning appears to be heavily reliant on neuroscientific studies in a non-offending 
population (Lamm and Majdandžic´ , 2015). Finally, there is a paucity of literature 
specifically in relation to the predictive abilities of executive functioning, as determined by 
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working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control. So, whilst the examination of 
executive functioning, in terms of theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral 
reasoning, appears to have shifted from an isolated view to a more associative perspective, 
additional research is needed in relation to a predictive explanation (Bradford et al., 2015). 
Therefore, to address these concerns, the present study assessed the ability of working 
memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control to predict theory of mind, empathic 
understanding and moral reasoning, in a cohort of male and female offenders. The following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H1. Working memory will predict: (a) theory of mind, (b) empathic understanding and (c) 
moral reasoning. 
 
H2. Cognitive flexibility will predict: (a) theory of mind, (b) empathic understanding and (c) 
moral reasoning. 
 
H3. Inhibitory control will predict: (a) theory of mind, (b) empathic understanding and (c) 
moral reasoning. 
 
Methodology 
Design 
In psychological research, it is common to study constructs that cannot be directly 
observed or directly measured; theory of mind (Suminar and Hastjarjo, 2016), empathic 
understanding (Hojat and LaNoue, 2014), and empathic understanding (Von Weltzien 
Hoivik, 2004), and executive functioning (Huizinga et al., 2006), are examples. For the 
purposes of this study executive functioning was reduced to its three main constituent factors: 
working memory (Gordon and Olson,1998), cognitive flexibility (Welsh et al., 1991) and 
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inhibitory control (Hala et al., 2003). A path analysis (IBM SPSS Amos version 23) was 
adopted as the most appropriate statistical procedure to investigate if abilities in working 
memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control could predict abilities in theory of mind, 
empathic understanding and empathic understanding. The model fit was evaluated according 
to the recommendations of Kline (2011), and included the chi-square likelihood ratio statistic, 
comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with 
associated 90% CI, and the standardised root mean square residual. 
Participants 
In total, 100 male offenders (aged 18- to 55-year olds; M ¼ 27.38, SD ¼ 7.095) were 
recruited from a male adult, category B, prison in England and 100 female offenders (aged 
18- to 55-year olds; M ¼ 30.24, SD ¼ 10.57) were recruited from a female adult, closed 
category prison in England. Category B male prisons and closed category female prisons 
house inmates who do not require maximum security, but for whom escape needs to be made 
difficult. All participants were serving a sentence of six months or less; this representing 
approximately 47 per cent of the prison population, and of whom approximately 59 per cent 
are likely to reoffend within one year of release (Prison Reform Trust, 2017). The samples 
self-selected by responding to posters placed on the wing notice-boards in the prison. As per 
the recruitment criteria, all participants were English speaking. No upper age limit was 
specified. No form of compensation was given, and participants were informed that taking 
part in the study would offer no benefit in relation to their sentence. 
Measures 
The following performance-based and self-report questionnaires were used to access 
theory of mind, moral reasoning, empathic understanding, working memory, cognitive 
flexibility and inhibitory control. 
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Theory of mind. The Social Stories Questionnaire (Lawson et al., 2004) consists of ten 
vignettes, each divided into three sub-sections containing either: a blatantly offensive 
utterance, a subtly offence utterance or no offensive utterance. Participants were asked if they 
thought a sub-section contained an utterance which might upset or offend another character 
and if so, to identify the dialogue line on which it appeared. Participants were awarded one 
mark for each target utterance correctly identified, to a maximum of 30 marks. Lawson et al. 
suggest that a low score indicates a less developed theory of mind, and vice versa. In the 
current study α ¼ 0.72. 
Empathic understanding. The empathy quotient (EQ) (Wakabayashi et al., 2006) was 
selected to measure empathic understanding. Participants read each of the 22 statements and 
judged the extent to which they agreed using a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Half the items were positively worded (e.g. “I really enjoy 
caring for other people”) and half negatively worded (e.g. “I find it difficult to judge if 
something is rude or polite”). The order of presentation of the statements was randomised. 
Participants scored two points if they recorded a strongly empathising response and one point 
if they recorded a slightly empathising response. Non-empathising responses scored no 
marks. The highest score obtainable is 44. The higher the score the more empathic the 
participant is deemed to be. The EQ is reported to have acceptable internal consistency, with 
a Cronbach’s α coefficient of 0.76 (Wakabayashi et al., 2006). In the current study α ¼ 0.81. 
Moral reasoning. The Socio-Moral Reflection Measure (Gibbs et al., 1992) assesses 
moral judgment; including contract, affiliation, life, property, law and legal justice. 
Participants responded to 11 statements using a three-point scale (very important, important 
and not important), as well as giving a short reason as to why they had attributed that level of 
importance to an item. Each reason was assessed by the current first author, matched against 
standardised answers and scored accordingly (1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 2.0, up to a maximum 
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of 4.0). The scores were summed and divided by the number of valid responses (a minimum 
of seven being required). The measure has been found to discriminate between offenders and 
non-offenders (Palmer and Begum, 2006) and to be appropriate for both males and females 
aged from 17 years onwards (r(372) ¼ 0.66; Gibbs et al., 1992). The measure is reported by 
its developers to have acceptable levels of test and retest reliability, r(234) ¼ 0.88, po0.001. 
In the current study α ¼ 0.93. 
Executive functioning. Executive functioning is noted as not having a “gold-standard” 
test used in its measurement (Chan et al., 2008; Salthouse, 2005). One possible explanation 
for this may lie in its multidimensional nature (Avirett and Mortimer, 2013). For the purposes 
of the present study, those dimensions were: working memory, cognitive flexibility and 
inhibitory control (McCloskey et al., 2009), and measures were selected accordingly. 
Working memory and cognitive flexibility. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI) is recognised to test aspects of executive functioning with the VIQ 
subscale measuring working memory, and the PIQ subscale measuring cognitive flexibility. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the present study the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), was used to 
measure working memory and cognitive flexibility. The test–retest reliabilities of the WASI 
are reported to range from 0.70 (seven subscales) to 0.90 (two subscales). Inter-scorer 
coefficients were very high, all being above 0.90. 
Inhibitory control. Von Hippel and Gonsalkorale (2005) suggested the MSCEIT 4th 
branch entitled “Managing Emotions” (Mayer et al., 2002) was well suited for the 
measurement of inhibitory control. This test has two subtests that assess how participants 
control their thoughts and behaviours by rating a number of possible actions ranging from 
“very ineffective” to “very effective”. The scoring criteria were originally determined by 
public consensus (n ¼ 5,000) or expert scoring (21 members of the International Society 
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Research on Emotions). The test-retest reliability for the full-scale MSCEIT V2.0 is α ¼ 0.86. 
In the current study α ¼ 0.76. 
Procedure 
Written consent was obtained from all participants in line with both Her Majesty’s 
Prison and Probation Services and the first author’s University’s ethical approval procedure. 
Participants were tested individually in an empty room in the prison. The first author sat in 
the room with the participant to provide help with reading if required. When no help was 
needed she remained silent, out of the participant’s direct line of vision, and at a suitable 
distance to protect the participant’s privacy. At all times a prison officer was stationed 
outside the room to ensure safety; the officer was not in the participant’s direct line of vision 
and again a suitable distance was maintained to protect the participant’s privacy. Each 
participant was given standard verbal instructions and told that the tests were not timed but 
should be completed as quickly as possible. The order that the measures were given was 
varied to reduce order effects. 
Results 
To test the hypotheses a path model was generated. All model variables were screened 
for missing data outliers and tested for assumptions; none were found. The hypothesised 
pathway is described in Figure 1. 
The hypothesised path analysis model was significant; χ2 (10, n = 200) = 64.998, p < 
.001, and a non-significant result is required for a good model fit. However, Raykov (2000) 
stated that when a sample size is 200 participants or over, such results may be disregarded as 
a large sample is known to routinely produce significant results in path analysis software. 
Further, in path analysis, several “fit” indices are used to establish whether a model can be 
accepted. Table I presents the fit indices for the present study. 
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The normed fit index (NFI) was 0.935. The NFI (also known as the Bentler-Bonett 
NFI) can vary from 0 to 1.0; with 1.0 equalling the ideal of 100 per cent. The NFI equals the 
difference between the χ2 of the null model and the χ2 of target model, divided by the χ2 of 
the null model. In other words, an NFI of 0.935 (as found in the present study) indicates the 
target model improves the fit by 93.5 per cent relative to the independence model. Byrne 
(1994) recommended that for an acceptable model fit this figure should exceed 0.90. The CFI 
was 0.942. This represents the ratio between the discrepancies of the target model to the 
discrepancy of the independence model. In simple terms, a value approaching 1.0 suggests 
that the default model is a better fit than is the independence model (Fan et al., 1999); in the 
present study this figure is 0.942. Byrne (1994) recommended that for an acceptable model fit 
this figure should exceed 0.93. Similarly, the incremental fit index in the target model in the 
present study is 0.944, which exceeds the recommended figure of 0.90 (Bollen, 1990). The 
root mean square residual (RMSEA) produced an index of 0.117, which is greater than the 
recommended index of 0.08 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). However, more recently Moss 
(2016) indicated that whilst zero represents a perfect fit, the maximum should be unlimited, 
especially when using large participant groups (as in the present study). Marsh et al. (1996) 
recommend that several fit indices are utilised to overcome individual index limitations and 
assess the model fit. Therefore, this model was acceptable and post hoc modifications were 
not conducted. 
Six of a possible nine path coefficients were found to be significant at the p < .001 level 
and two were significant at the p < .05 level (see Table 2). 
To summarise, H1a (that working memory will be predictive of theory of mind) and 
H1b (that working memory will be predictive of empathic understanding). Similarly, H2a 
(that cognitive flexibility will be predictive of theory of mind) was supported. Finally, H3a 
(that inhibitory control will be predictive of theory of mind), H3b (that inhibitory control will 
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be predictive of empathic understanding) and H3c (that inhibitory control will be predictive 
of Moral reasoning) were supported. All other hypotheses were not supported. 
Discussion 
The current study had the aim of investigating whether working memory, cognitive 
flexibility and inhibitory control would predict theory of mind, empathic understanding and 
moral reasoning in male and female offenders. The study found that executive functioning, as 
determined by working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control, was indeed 
predictive of theory of mind. One explanation for this may be found in the processing 
abilities of the construct. For example, Borst et al. (2010) described working memory as a 
cognitive “bottleneck” in that it is only able to store a limited amount of information for a 
short period of time before that information is lost. According to Borst et al., this problem is 
addressed by transforming information into “chunks” that can more easily fit through the 
“bottleneck”; thus, allowing a person to process complex pieces of information more 
efficiently. Arslan et al. (2017) noted that a less flexible or deficient working memory may 
constrain the ability to do this, and so may result in lower scores in complex measures of 
theory of mind. Spenser et al. (2015) noted that theory of mind is important in the context of 
offending behaviours. Specifically, these researchers found, in a study of 46 young male 
offenders and a matched control group, that the offenders had a significantly reduced ability 
in theory of mind when compared to the non-offenders. 
The present study also found cognitive flexibility to be predictive of theory of mind. 
One explanation for this may lie with the “Cognitive Complexity and Control” theory (Zelazo 
and Frye, 1998) which states that cognitive flexibility is needed to shift efficiently between 
multiple incompatible perspectives, descriptions, intentions or situations ( Jacques and 
Zelazo, 2005). Indeed, Liszkowski (2013) proposed that such flexibility is critical for social 
understanding. This was supported by Bock et al. (2015) who found cognitive flexibility to be 
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positively associated with theory of mind, even after controlling for age and vocabulary. 
Bock et al. concluded that the ability to make simultaneous judgments, from multiple and 
sequentially shifting situations, is critical for understanding everyday interactions. 
Consequently, deficiencies in cognitive flexibility may be predictive of a reduced theory of 
mind, which in turn may be a factor related to antisocial or offending behaviours (Spenser et 
al., 2015). 
Inhibitory control was also found to be predictive theory of mind. As noted above, 
executive functioning is a multifaceted construct that includes the ability to shift between 
behavioural responses when the “rules” relating to a situation are changed (Lehto et al., 
2003). Specifically, inhibitory control refers to the cognitive processes that inhibit automatic 
responses, and so allow for the accomplishment of goal-directed tasks. Alexander et al. 
(2002) offered an example, noting that individuals with weaker inhibitory control appear to 
have difficulty in suppressing their own immediate responses long enough to search in their 
memory for a more considered response to a given situation. The ability to consider situations 
from a number of different perspectives to resolve issues and solve problems is a key factor 
in avoiding offending behaviours (Lösel and Beelmamm, 2005). 
As with theory of mind, the present study suggests that executive functioning is 
generally predictive of empathic understanding. However, in terms of working memory, 
cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control the present study found working memory and 
inhibitory control to be predictive of empathic understanding, but not cognitive flexibility, 
working memory and empathic understanding are core constructs in psychological research; 
each being considered essential for normal social functioning (Smith et al., 2014). Certainly, 
each construct has been extensively researched from a developmental (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004), social (Blakemore,2008) and neuroscientific (Decety and Jackson, 
2004) perspective. However, whilst empathic understanding is said to require an individual to 
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extract salient information relating to a given situation and form a coherent “mental” 
representation, a skill which calls on working memory (Henderson and Hollingworth, 2003), 
research considering the correlates of the two constructs has to some extent been neglected 
(Gao et al., 2016). From this perspective, Gao et al. reasoned that the more information a 
person can store in his or her working memory, the easier it should be for that person to 
extract social cues from a situation, and so understand the perspective of another. Solomon 
(2007) noted that the ability of an offender to recognise and manage his or her own emotions, 
as well as those of others, and subsequently make more effective and controlled life 
decisions, was crucial for desistance from crime. 
In contrast, the ability of cognitive flexibility to predict empathic understanding was not 
supported by the present study. One important characteristic of cognitive flexibility is the 
ability to accurately decode and understand numerous “expressions” that may occur during 
any one social interaction (Gery et al., 2009). Conversely, a reduced ability in cognitive 
flexibility may be associated with a failure to use salient information to predict the 
consequences of one’s own, as well as another person’s, actions (Heinz et al., 2011); and so, 
lead to social inadequacy or inappropriate behaviours (Tirapu-Ustárroz et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the findings of the present study were somewhat unexpected. One explanation 
may be found by noting that Makino (2010) suggested self-report measures (as used in the 
current study) do not always represent the true feelings and beliefs of an individual. 
Therefore, future studies may wish to adopt a performance-based measure of cognitive 
flexibility. 
However, the present study did find that inhibitory control was predictive of empathic 
understanding. According to Eisenberg and Fabes (1998), prosocial individuals tend to be 
good “inhibiters”, with low impulsivity, whereas poor inhibition and high impulsivity are 
associated with antisocial or offending behaviours. Eisenburg (2007) built on this by 
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suggesting that when prosocial behaviours were “costly” to a person, the ability to 
successfully inhibit automatic responses, from both an emotional and a behavioural 
perspective, was extremely important. Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) also suggested that 
individuals who can “inhibit” are less likely to be overwhelmed by their own emotions when 
witnessing another person in need or distress. 
With regards to moral reasoning, neither working memory nor cognitive flexibility was 
found to be predictive. One explanation for this may be that moral schemas, or frameworks, 
are thought to reside in long-term memory, and not working memory (Rest et al., 1999). 
Moral reasoning is said to form when a person notes similarities between his or her 
remembered experiences. According to Endicott et al. (2003), there are three different 
frameworks in which these moral schemas fit: the personal interest framework, the 
maintaining norms framework and the post-conventional framework. The “personal interest 
framework” is the most primitive and relies on an egocentric and interpersonal perspective. In 
contrast, the “maintaining norms framework”, which usually emerges in adolescence, is 
characterised by the perceived need for a society-wide system of cooperation and the uniform 
application of laws and social norms. Finally, the “post-conventional framework”, which is 
the most complex of the three, is characterised by the core belief that “moral obligations 
[should] be based on shared ideals, which are reciprocal and are open to debate and tests of 
logical consistency, and on the experience of the community” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 307). 
Therefore, if moral judgements are based on schemes and frameworks, as well as personal 
memories, all of which are stored in long-term memory, the findings of the present study 
appear appropriate in that only working memory was assessed. Therefore, future studies may 
wish to consider the effect of long-term memory on moral reasoning. 
As noted above, the expected predictive relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
moral reasoning was not found. The hypothesis relating to the predicative abilities of 
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cognitive flexibility in relation to moral reasoning was based on Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of 
moral development. Kohlberg suggested that an age-related “shift” in moral reasoning was 
characterised by a move from a relatively rigid way of thinking to a more flexible style. This 
flexibility is said to enable a person to utilise the multiple moral schemas that are held in his 
or her long-term memory (Wilson and Ross, 2003). One explanation for the current study’s 
finding may be found in the theory of “Cognitive Blockade” (Cañas et al., 2006), which is 
characterised by a tendency to continue with an initial behaviour, even when reasoning 
suggests that an alternative course of action is required. This was demonstrated by Whitton et 
al. (2014) who assessed 68 individuals for cognitive flexibility using three types of moral 
dilemma: benign, impersonal and personal. Whitton et al. concluded that as a result of 
personal situations or obsessions, some individuals have a more rigid moral reasoning in 
response to moral dilemmas; thus, offering an explanation for the fact that cognitive 
flexibility was not shown to be predictive of moral reasoning in present study. 
The present study did find that inhibitory control was predictive of moral reasoning. 
Inhibitory control has been defined as the ability to inhibit dominant, maladaptive responses, 
either under instruction or in novel or ambiguous situations (Rothbart et al., 2001). Hoffman 
(2000) noted that IC, as well as regulating emotional responses, plays a role in moral decision 
making. Indeed, Narvaez (2010) stated that to integrate the rational, emotional and intuitive 
aspects involved in moral reasoning, the ability to control or inhibit personal responses is 
needed. Confirmation of this is also found in the earlier work of Eisenberg et al. (1995) who 
argued that over arousal, resulting from negative affect in moral conflict situations, may lead 
to personal distress. In contrast, individuals who can inhibit negative effects are thought to 
experience sympathy and consequently display other-centric response tendencies. In other 
words, individuals with high levels of inhibitory control can self-regulate, reflect upon their 
own behaviours and when necessary feel guilt (Malti and Ongley, 2014). Such an association 
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has been documented by Gagne and Saudino (2010) who found inhibitory control to be a 
significant genetic component in terms of similarities in moral behaviours between twins. 
From this perspective, the self-regulation afforded by inhibitory control (Derryberry and 
Rothbart, 1997) may play a crucial role in the occurrence of sympathy and reparative 
behaviours (Malti and Ongley, 2014). Ward and Nee (2009) noted that the ability to make 
moral decisions from a socially acceptable perspective, the offender must consider his or her 
behaviours from the point of view of society, as well as his or her own personal values. 
There are a number of limitations to the current study. First, it focussed only on 
offenders serving a custodial sentence of six months or less. As more than 250,000 offenders 
are currently managed by the probation service (Prison Reform Trust, 2017), future studies 
may also wish to consider offenders serving a community sentence or under post-sentence 
supervision. Similarly, as the recidivism rate for individuals serving short sentences in the 
UK is approximately 59 per cent at the one-year mark (Prison Reform Trust, 2017), future 
studies may benefit from noting the antecedents (if any) of the participants. Lastly, the 
present study did not differentiate between the crime categories or take into consideration the 
socio-environmental backgrounds or ethnicity of either the offending and non-offending 
groups. Whilst, Chen and Howitt (2007) noted that this is not uncommon, Seruca and Silva 
(2016) found an association between offending categories and mentally flexibility and Entorf 
and Spengler (2000) stated that factors such as drug dependency, education or employment 
status should not be overlooked. Therefore, in the future, a more fine-grained approach could 
further establish the generalisability of the current findings.  
Despite these limitations, the implications of the present study should not be 
underestimated. A well-known goal of the criminal justice system is to reduce levels of 
recidivism. Theories as to how this best achieved have shifted recently from a “punish them 
hard enough and they won’t come back” ethos, to a more integrated rehabilitative approach 
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(Hooley, 2010, p. 3). In the UK, the Thinking Skills Programme, which aims at addressing 
offending behaviours by targeting reduced cognitive skills (e.g. theory of mind, empathic 
understanding, and moral reasoning),is very popular. However, Inciardi et al. (2004) noted 
that the more focussed the intervention is to the specific needs of an offender, the greater the 
impact will be. Similarly, Weaver and McNeill (2010) stated that it is essential to allow for 
individual differences in rehabilitation if desistance is to be achieved. In other words, a one-
size-fits-all approach is unlikely to work. Therefore, if executive functioning (broken down 
into its main constructs of working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control) is 
predictive of theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning, pre-screening 
tests in these areas may be able to more accurately assess an offenders’ suitability for a 
programme, or indeed tailor it to meet the specific needs of that person. 
To conclude, cognitive mechanisms such as the capacity to feel, understand and 
differentiate between complex thoughts, beliefs and emotions, and to adapt to different social 
situations are important for successful human social interaction (Marques et al., 2015). To the 
authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first to examine the abilities of the three key sub-
constructs of executive functioning: working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory 
control, to predict levels of theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning; 
something that may be of interest to practitioners and researchers alike, and as such adds 
substantially to the literature. 
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Table 1 Results for path analysis for executive functioning to predict theory of mind, 
empathic understanding and moral reasoning 
NFI CFI IFI RMSEA χ2 df Probability 
.935 .942 .944 .117 64.995 10 <.001 
Note: Because AMOS is unable to incorporate means and intercepts, the current model used 
estimates. For this reason a goodness of fit index (GFI) was not calculated  
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Table 2 Standardised path coefficients 
 Theory of mind Empathic 
understanding 
Moral reasoning 
Working memory .24*** .24*** .00 
Cognitive flexibility .20*** .05 .01 
Inhibitory control .12* .25*** .97*** 
Note: *,***Indicate values of p < .05; p < .001, respectively  
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          Figure 1: Hypothesised Path Analysis for WM, CF, and IC to predict ToM, EU, and MR 
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